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THE “PROGRESS CLAUSE”
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION
OF PATENT LAW
published in N.C. Journal of Law and Technology, volume 15
Distinguished Professor of Law
BA, Yale College
JD, Yale Law School
Lori Andrews is a distinguished professor of law at IIT Chicago-Kent and director of IIT’s Institute for Science, Law and Technology. She has been a visiting professor at Case West-
ern Reserve University School of Law and at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and In-
ternational Affairs at Princeton University. The ABA Journal describes her as “a lawyer with a 
literary bent who has the scientific chops to rival any CSI investigator.” She is an internationally 
recognized authority on emerging technologies, a mystery novelist, and the creator of a Social 
Network Constitution.
Professor Andrews is involved in setting policies for genetic technologies. She has been an 
adviser on genetic and reproductive technology to Congress, the World Health Organization, 
the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Institute of Medicine of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, and several foreign nations, including the emirate of Dubai and the French 
National Assembly. She has served as chair of the federal Working Group on the Ethical, Legal, 
and Social Implications of the Human Genome Project and as a consultant to the science 
ministers of 12 countries on the issues of embryo stem cells, gene patents, and DNA banking. 
She has also advised artists wanting to use genetic engineering to become creators with a cap-
ital “C” and invent new living species. Her media appearances include “Nightline” and “The 
Oprah Winfrey Show” and virtually every major program in between.
Recently, Professor Andrews filed an amici curiae brief in the U.S. Supreme Court on 
behalf of medical organizations, including the American Medical Association, in Association 
for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/landrews.
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W hen the Founding Fathers were drafting the U.S. Constitution, they thought about how best to encourage innovation in their new nation. The 
result was Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. This clause provides that Congress shall have the power 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. . . . ”
The Progress Clause, designed to reward the creation and 
sharing of new knowledge, is the constitutional basis for the 
intellectual property system in existence today. But it also 
serves to limit what can be patented.
In a series of cases over the past 150 years, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has consistently held that one cannot patent abstract 
ideas, laws of nature, products of nature, or materials iso-
lated from products of nature if those materials behave in 
the same way they would in nature. In 1853, when Samuel 
Morse convinced the Patent Office to grant him a patent on 
all uses of electromagnetic waves to write at a distance, the 
Supreme Court said that he could not patent the law of 
A summary of The “Progress Clause”: An Empirical Analysis Based on the Constitutional 
Foundation of Patent Law, 15 North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 537 (2014).
THE “PROGRESS CLAUSE”
An Empirical Analysis Based on the
Constitutional Foundation of Patent Law
BY LORI B. ANDREWS
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nature that covers every such use of electro-
magnetic waves. He could only patent his 
invention—the telegraph. 
In 1980, the first Supreme Court case 
dealing with biotechnology made clear that 
the exemption is just as relevant in the mod-
ern biotech age. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, involved a man-made (ge-
netically engineered) bacterium, which the 
Court carefully described as not naturally 
occurring.  In that case, the Court stated:
The laws of nature, physical phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas have 
been held not patentable. Thus, 
a new mineral discovered in the 
earth or a new plant found in 
the wild is not patentable subject 
matter. Likewise, Einstein could 
not patent his celebrated law that 
E=mc2; nor could Newton have 
patented the law of gravity. Such 
discoveries are “manifestations 
of . . . nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.”
The Chakrabarty Court held that an 
invention from a product of nature is only 
patentable if it is “markedly different” from 
nature. The reason it is important not to 
have patents on products of nature or laws 
of nature is that, in the words of Justice 
Breyer in 2006, it would give inventors “too 
much patent protection” and “impede rather 
than ‘promote . . . ’ the constitutional ob-
jective of patent and copyright protection.”
The premise behind the prohibition of patents on products of nature is that 
such patents will impede innovation in vi-
olation of the Progress Clause. But is that 
premise correct? A 2013 case, Ass’n for Mo-
lecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), in which the Su-
preme Court invalidated patents on human 
genes, provides the perfect setting in which 
to analyze whether patents on products of 
nature lead to progress or impede it. Over 
100 amicus briefs and over 90 affidavits 
(including one from a Nobel Laureate in 
economics) were filed in the case. These 
materials analyzed every study that was 
ever done about gene patents. 
The question of whether gene patents 
spur or impede innovation can be bro-
ken into two parts. First, are gene patents 
necessary to spur initial innovation—the 
location and identification of the gene se-
quence? Second, do gene sequence patents 
spur or impede subsequent innovation—the 
study of the prevalence of the related disor-
der, the development of diagnostic testing, 
and the development of treatments?
Studies suggest that patents are not 
necessary to ensure the discovery of genetic 
sequences. Scientists were searching for 
and finding genes long before patents were 
available. They try to discover genes for 
many reasons—to help mankind, win 
Nobel Prizes, attain academic achieve-
ment, and create professional status. 
Most geneticists are willing to undertake 
research to discover genes without pat-
enting them. In fact, in a study of 1,229 
American Society of Human Genetics 
members, 61% of those in industry, 
78% of those in government, and 77% of 
academic scientists stated that they disap-
proved of patenting DNA.
The patent incentive can actually im-
pede the discovery of human genes. When 
Jonathan Shestack’s son was diagnosed with 
autism in 1992, experts estimated that re-
searchers would need DNA samples from 
at least 100 families with two or more au-
tistic members in order to pinpoint a gene 
associated with autism. Shestack contacted 
the four groups of university scientists who 
were searching for autism genes and of-
fered them funding. He discovered that no 
group had enough DNA samples to deter-
mine which genes are autism-related, but 
The “Progress Clause”
there were more than enough if the groups 
pooled their samples. Shestack asked the 
four groups to share their DNA samples 
with each other so that they all had a bet-
ter shot at identifying autism-related genes. 
Every researcher with whom he spoke re-
fused to share samples. Each wanted to be 
the one to find the autism gene and patent 
it. Rather than speeding up the discovery 
of a gene sequence related to autism, the 
possibility of obtaining a patent on the 
gene slowed it down.
Moreover, once genes are patented, 
they impede further innovation at both the 
individual laboratory level and at a system-
wide level. These impediments occur in at 
least four ways: (1) discouraging scientific 
researchers’ undertaking of genetic research; 
(2) discouraging scientific researchers’ pub-
lic disclosure of data; (3) discouraging sci-
entific researchers’ cooperation with each 
other; and (4) discouraging people from 
participating in genetic research. 
A substantial number of geneticists 
report that gene patents detrimentally im-
pact subsequent discoveries. Forty-nine 
percent of American Society of Human 
Genetics members reported being forced 
to limit their research in some way due to 
the existence of various gene patents.
Gene patents have a negative impact 
on follow-up research and the production 
of public genetic knowledge. There is a 5% 
to 17% reduction in the rate of scientific 
citations after the issuance of a patent. 
The study authors interpret the decline in 
citations “as a net loss to long-run public 
knowledge production.”
Patents on human genes impede the 
development, deployment, and improve-
ment of genetic tests. A study that surveyed 
genetics lab directors revealed that at least 
25% of labs had abandoned one or more 
genetic tests that they themselves had de-
veloped, due to notification from the pat-
ent holder or licensee. In addition, 53% of 
genetics labs had stopped developing new 
clinical genetic tests due to concerns about 
gene patents and licensing patent rights.
Gene patents can hinder innovation in 
a less direct manner as well. Potential re-
search subjects are less likely to participate 
in research if they are aware that their genes 
will be patented—32% of those surveyed 
said they would be offended if research 
conducted with their own tissue was used 
for patenting of products.
The increase in secrecy in the university 
laboratories (prompted by the desire to 
patent findings) is also damaging the train-
ing of new scientists. A survey of doctoral 
students and postdoctoral fellows in the life 
sciences revealed profound effects of data 
withholding on the next generation of sci-
entists. Of the trainees surveyed, 49% said 
withholding of information had a negative 
effect on progress in their laboratory and 
33% felt it interfered with their education.
What if each generation of scientists was forbidden to use—or even 
think about—the theorems, principles, and 
“Studies suggest that patents are not necessary to 
ensure the discovery of genetic sequences. Scientists 
were searching for and finding genes long before 
patents were available. . . . The patent incentive can 
actually impede the discovery of human genes.”
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natural phenomena that had been discov-
ered or proven by the previous generation 
of scientists? In order to assure that does 
not happen, a patentability analysis under 
the Progress Clause requires courts to assess 
whether the purported invention is actually 
an unpatentable product of nature, law of 
nature, or abstract ideas and (in the words 
of the Supreme Court) to weigh “how much 
future innovation is foreclosed relative to 
the contribution of the inventor.” Analyses 
of the impact of gene patents demonstrate 
how patents on products of nature can im-
pede initial and subsequent innovation. 
Consequently, the underlying goals of the 
Progress Clause are served by the Myriad 




I Know Who You Are and I Saw What You Did: So-
cial Networks and the Death of Privacy (Free Press 
2012, paperback 2013).
Genetics: Ethics, Law and Policy (Thomson/West 3d 
ed. 2010) (with M. Mehlman & M. Rothstein).
Articles and Contributions to Books
An Informed Consent Model for Privacy and 
Data Collection in the Gameful World, in The 
Gameful World (S. Walz & S. Deterding eds., 
MIT Press, forthcoming 2014).
Social Networks: Impact on Biotechnology Re-
search, Health Care, and Human Rights, in 
Biennial Review of Law, Science and Technology: 
Biotechnology, Health Inequality, and Distributive 
Justice (Institutum Jurisprudentiae, Academia Si-
nica, forthcoming 2014).
Where’s Waldo?: Geolocation, Mobile Apps, and 
Privacy, 9 SciTech Lawyer 6 (summer 2013).
A Pound of Flesh: Patient Legal Action for Hu-
man Research Protections in the Biotech Age, in 
Patients as Policy Actors (B. Hoffman et al. eds., 
Rutgers University Press 2011) (with J. Burger 
Chronis).
Who Owns Your Body? A Study in Literature and 
Law, 84 Chicago-Kent Law Review 3 (2009) (sym-
posium editor and contributor).
Gene patent protesters demonstrate outside of the 
Supreme Court Building (Photo credit: Lori Andrews).
[ 7 ] FALL 2014
{Creativity}
EXPERIMENTAL TESTS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS’
CREATIVITY THRESHOLDS
published in Texas Law Review, volume 92
Associate Professor of Law
BS, Georgia Institute of Technology
JD, University of Georgia Law School
PhD, University of Chicago (in progress)
Christopher Buccafusco joined the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty in 2009 and was voted Pro-fessor of the Year by the Student Bar Association for 2009–10. He teaches Torts, Copy-
right, and a course on Law and Food. His research interests include intellectual property law, 
behavioral law and economics, law and psychology, and legal history. His recent work focuses 
on valuing creativity and innovation and on the application of happiness research to the law. 
His research has been supported by grants from Google, the Olin Foundation, and the Batten 
Foundation. His published articles have appeared in the Columbia Law Review, University 
of Chicago Law Review (twice), California Law Review, Cornell Law Review (twice), 
and Georgetown Law Journal.
Before coming to Chicago-Kent, Professor Buccafusco taught for a year as a visiting fac-
ulty member at the University of Illinois College of Law. He is the co-director of the recently- 
established Center for Empirical Studies of Intellectual Property at Chicago-Kent.
For more, visit his faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/cbuccafusco.
Buccafusco
Christopher J.
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In the United States, intellectual property (IP) law is intended to encourage the production of new creative works and inventions. Copyright and patent laws do this 
by providing authors and inventors with a bundle of ex-
clusive rights relating to the use and development of their 
creations. Importantly, however, these fields differ greatly in 
the ways that they determine whether some new creation is 
sufficiently innovative to merit legal protection. Copyright 
law sets the creativity bar for new works of authorship es-
pecially low, whereas patent law demands that a putative 
inventor prove that her creation is highly innovative. 
Although this difference has been noted repeatedly in the 
past and explained as a matter of various differences between 
copyrightable and patentable subject matter, relatively little 
research has focused on whether the different IP thresholds 
affect the incentives and behavior of creators. This is an im-
portant question, because it should influence the current 
debate about where creativity thresholds in IP law should 
be set. Some scholars have suggested that copyright should 
apply a higher threshold to encourage better creativity, while 
A summary of Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 
Texas Law Review 1921 (2014) (with Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer, & Christopher 
Jon Sprigman).
EXPERIMENTAL TESTS
of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds
BY CHRISTOPHER J. BUCCAFUSCO
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others have suggested that IP laws’ incen-
tive structures may be doing more harm 
than good.
Legal scholarship on the effects of dif-
fering IP thresholds on creators has gener-
ally relied on standard economic assump-
tions about the way that people respond 
to incentives. Creators are assumed to be 
rational and to respond to increased in-
centives by producing more and better 
creations. According to this reasoning, be-
cause patent law requires more creativity as 
a pre-condition to the conferral of IP rights 
compared to what copyright law requires, 
creators subject to the patent regime will be 
encouraged to be more creative than those 
subject to the copyright regime.
Recent research in the social sciences, 
however, suggests that the connection be-
tween incentives and behavior—particularly 
with regard to creativity—is not always so 
straightforward. Although there is research 
that indicates that providing incentives to 
act creatively has the expected effect of in-
creasing creativity, other research suggests 
that the kinds of incentives that are offered 
and the manner of their provision can un-
dermine creative behavior. For example, 
monetary incentives to perform creative 
tasks may dampen creativity. In such cases, 
the monetary incentive may create an ex-
trinsic motivation for the behavior that 
can “crowd out” the intrinsic motivation 
to be creative. Moreover, importantly for 
our purposes, increasing the magnitude of 
an incentive to be creative may not always 
lead to more or better behavior. Once cre-
ativity incentives reach a certain salience or 
intensity, there is a risk that people will be 
overly focused on achieving the incentive 
and “choke.”
Of course, the kinds of creativity that 
IP law deals with are highly varied. The 
innovative leap associated with designing 
a graphical user interface or with develop-
ing a new drug may be quite different from 
creativity involved in painting or poetry. 
There may also be differences in creativity 
within the separate IP regimes: although 
both painting and poetry are within the 
domain of copyright law, thinking cre-
atively about line, shape, and color could 
be very different from thinking creatively 
about diction, meter, and rhyme. Because 
the cognition associated with these efforts 
may be very different, one might think that 
the effects of thresholds on creativity could 
be different as well.
In a series of experiments reported in this Article, we extend the research on the 
effects of incentives for creativity into the 
realm of intellectual property. Specifically, 
we test whether the existence of a creativity 
threshold that conditions entry into a prize 
lottery on meeting certain performance 
standards affects how creative people are. 
The experiments reported here involve var-
ious creativity tasks in which subjects are 
randomly assigned to conditions that are 
intended to model the different creativity 
thresholds employed by copyright and pat-
ent law. Doing so allows us to test whether 
the existence and nature of a threshold in-
creases, decreases, or does not affect sub-
jects’ creativity.
The subjects for all of our experiments 
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. They were paid $0.50 for participat-
ing, and they were told that they would 
have a chance to earn a $500 prize if they 
won a creativity game. Subjects were ran-
domly assigned to one of five conditions:
No Incentive—Game score didn’t mat-
ter. Each subject would be assigned a lot-
tery ticket for the prize.
Copyright—Game score mattered, and 
the better they did in the game the more 
lottery tickets they would get.
Patent High—Game score mattered, 
but only the subjects scoring in the top 
IP Laws’ Creativity Thresholds
5% would receive lottery tickets based on 
their scores. Subjects whose scores were be-
low the top 5% would not receive lottery 
tickets.
Patent Mid—Same as Patent High ex-
cept the threshold was set at the top 25%.
Patent Low—Same as Patent High ex-
cept the threshold was set at the top 50%.
The first experiment involved com-
putational creativity similar to the kinds 
of problems that face computer scientists, 
engineers, and biologists. Subjects were 
asked to solve a “knapsack problem” in 
which they had to maximize the value of 
the goods in a knapsack without exceed-
ing its weight limit. Because they were only 
given a limited time to solve the problem, 
they were not able to calculate the optimal 
answer but instead had to use heuristics.
Subjects in the Patent conditions pro-
vided significantly better solutions than 
did those in the Copyright and No Incen-
tive conditions. (See Figure 1.) When en-
couraged to score better in order to win the 
prize, people tended to improve their per-
formance. Importantly, however, subjects 
in the Copyright condition, where better 
performance was rewarded, did not pro-
vide more answers than subjects in the No 
Incentive condition, where performance 
was unrelated to reward. 
The second experiment involved ver-
bal creativity. Subjects were asked to pro-
vide as many creative uses of the word 
“key” as they could in 90 seconds. Creative 
uses included “John Maynard Keyes” or 
“monkey.” Again, subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of the five threshold con-
ditions, and again those in the Patent con-
ditions tended to outperform those in the 
Copyright and No Incentive conditions. 
Our results were not as strong here as they 
were in the first experiment, but the over-
all pattern is similar. For example, subjects 
in the No Incentive conditions produced 
5.12 creative answers, those in the Copy-
right condition produced 5.32 creativity 
answers, while those in the Patent Mid 
condition produced 6.51 creative answers. 
A third experiment involving visual 
creativity, however, failed to detect any 
Wagon Weight (max = 684)
Figure 1.
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significant differences between the threshold 
conditions. Similarly, in a task that did not 
involve creativity (adding sets of numbers) 
there were no significant differences be-
tween the conditions.
This research suggests two important lessons about the effects of thresholds 
on creativity incentives. First, the incentive 
provided by the Copyright condition never 
produced more or better creativity than No 
Incentive condition. Our subjects seemed 
to be willing to engage in creative activities 
even when no external monetary motiva-
tion was at stake.
Second, subjects tended to perform 
more creatively when there was some 
threshold for receiving the reward. And in 
no case did the Patent conditions ever pro-
duce worse creativity than the Copyright 
or No Incentive conditions. Accordingly, 
our results provide some support for the use 
of higher thresholds in IP law, and they do 
not support the view that higher thresholds 
will inhibit performance.
This research should help illuminate 
the debate about the role of creativity 
thresholds in IP law. Of course, this is just 
the beginning of empirical investigation in 




Happiness and the Law (Univ. of Chicago Press, 
forthcoming 2014) (with John Bronsteen and 
Jonathan Masur).
Articles
Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic 
Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 
87 Southern California Law Review 276 (2014) 
(with Jonathan Masur).
What’s a Name Worth? Valuing Attribution in 
Intellectual Property, 93 Boston University Law 
Review 1389 (2013) (with Christopher Sprigman 
& Zachary Burns).
Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the 
Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright 
Term Extension, 28 Berkeley Technology Law Jour-
nal 1 (2013) (with Paul Heald).
Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 
Duke Law Journal 1603 (2013) (with John Bron-
steen and Jonathan Masur).
Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law, 97 
Cornell Law Review 501 (2012).
The Creativity Effect, 78 University of Chicago 
Law Review 31 (2011) (with Christopher Sprig-
man).
of creativity that IP law addresses. Our 
subjects were amateurs not professionals, 
our tasks were short term rather than long 
term, and our subjects worked individually 
rather than in groups. All of these differ-
ences could produce alternative results, and 
we are excited about the prospect of doing 
that research. Ultimately, however, these 
problems require data and research and not 
merely speculation and assumption.  ■
“Our results provide some 
support for the use of higher 
thresholds in IP law, and they 
do not support the view that 
higher thresholds will inhibit 
performance.”




A SIMPLE PROPOSAL TO
SPUR INNOVATION
published in Arizona State Law Journal, volume 45
Edward Lee is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Program in Intellectual Property Law at IIT Chicago-Kent. He is the founder and managing director of The Free Internet 
Project, a nonprofit whose mission is to provide the public with information about the latest 
legal and technological efforts to protect Internet freedoms around the world. Previously, he 
was a fellow at the Stanford Center for Internet Society and a professor of law at The Ohio 
State University Moritz College of Law. He is a cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, 
where he was an editor and co-chair of the books and commentaries office of the Harvard 
Law Review. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa and summa cum laude from Williams College.
Professor Lee’s research focuses on the ways in which the Internet, technological devel-
opment, and globalization challenge existing legal paradigms. His book The Fight for the 
Future chronicles the grassroots protests in the United States and European Union to stop 
two controversial copyright proposals that people feared would lead to greater policing and 
censorship of the Internet. His current research conceptualizes the popular efforts around the 
world to protect Internet freedom as a new form of popular constitutionalism. In addition to 
numerous articles, he co-authored a leading casebook with Daniel Chow titled International 
Intellectual Property: Problems, Cases, and Materials (West Group 2d ed. 2012).
From 1996 to 1999, Professor Lee was a litigation associate in the Washington, D.C., 
office of Mayer, Brown & Platt, working at all levels of trial and appellate litigation, including 
cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. Immediately following law school, he clerked for the 
Honorable John T. Noonan Jr. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
For more, visit his faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/elee.
Professor of Law
BA, Williams College
JD, Harvard Law School
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Pinterest is the fastest growing website ever, sparking a new fascination among millions of people. The social network allows people to save Internet con-
tent and “pin” it to their own “pinboards.” In 2013, Pinterest 
closed two more rounds of funding of $200- and $225 mil-
lion, respectively, with its valuation more than doubling to 
$3.8 billion. Everyone seems to love using Pinterest, from 
ordinary Internet users to businesses, celebrities, and even 
the President. 
Pinterest faces one problem: its activity may not be en-
tirely legal. The “pin it” technology of Pinterest enables its 
users to copy vast amounts of copyrighted content—mainly 
photographs, but potentially any content—directly from 
websites and without permission of the copyright owners. 
The copied photographs and content are then displayed on 
Pinterest user pages and easily copied and shared with other 
user boards through a seamless “repin it” feature. Although 
Pinterest’s pin/repin functionality may arguably fall within 
the safe harbor of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), the argument is debatable, if not doubtful, and 
A summary of Copyright-Exempt Nonprofits: A Simple Proposal to Spur Innovation, 45 Ari-
zona State Law Journal 1433 (2014).
NONPROFITS
A Simple Proposal to Spur Innovation
BY EDWARD LEE
COPYRIGHT-EXEMPT
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has not been tested in court.
The Pinterest example is emblematic 
of a larger problem. The Copyright Act of 
1976, which originated with the analog 
technologies of the 1970s in mind, is out-
dated and out-of-sync with the advances 
of the Internet and digital technologies. 
Because the 1976 Act was made for a dif-
ferent era, disruptive new Internet plat-




right litigation that 
may take years to 
resolve.
This Article 
explains how U.S. 
copyright law cur-
rently harms inno-
vation in Internet 
platforms and of-
fers a solution for 
Congress to enact 
a copyright exemption that specifically fos-
ters innovation in Internet platforms, while 
protecting the interests of authors. The 
proposal is not a panacea for the problem, 
much less a comprehensive revision of the 
Copyright Act. Instead, the proposal is one 
model for how the copyright system can es-
tablish a more coherent innovation policy 
for today’s Internet age.
In his pathbreaking 1997 work The In-novator’s Dilemma, Clayton Christensen 
identified a paradoxical dilemma facing 
businesses that seek to innovate: the more 
established and successful the company, 
the less able to innovate it is. The past 
successes of a company effectively color—
and limit—the investment decisions and 
expectations on return. As a result, es-
tablished companies may have a much 
more difficult time than startups—which 
are unencumbered by past successes and 
views—in developing and creating suc-
cessful new disruptive technologies. Under 
Christensen’s innovator’s dilemma, the 
legacy of a business’s success may be a loss 
in its ability to innovate.
Borrowing Christensen’s helpful ter-
minology, this Article posits that U.S. 
copyright law functions much like an es-
tablished business or firm. The 1976 Act 
represents a set of value decisions made 
for technologies and 
modes of content 
distribution and ex-
ploitation that are be-
coming increasingly 
obsolete. However 
successful the 1976 
Act may have been 
in spurring, or at 
least not impeding, 
the development of 
analog technologies, 
that success no lon-
ger holds true with 
digital technologies. The paradox is that, 
of all the areas of law, copyright law most 
directly bears on what new Internet plat-
forms can be developed legally, yet copy-
right law is the least developed to spur in-
novation in new platforms today.
Simply stated, the copyright innova-
tor’s dilemma is the following: the more 
innovative or different a new speech tech-
nology is in terms of utilizing content, 
the more likely the technology will face a 
copyright lawsuit or challenge. Under this 
copyright innovator’s dilemma, technolog-
ical innovation in speech technologies will 
not occur unless developers assume the risk 
of substantial—and potentially crushing—
copyright liability.
The major problem that any new In-
ternet platform or speech technology faces 
is the specter of a massive copyright law-
suit. A new platform that no one uses is 
unlikely to draw litigation. But as a new 
“This Article outlines a pro-
posal for how Congress can 
update the Copyright Act 
to spur greater innovation 
in Internet platforms, while 
protecting the interests of 
authors.”
A Simple Proposal to Spur Innovation
platform gains popularity—meaning it has 
provided social value to a greater number 
of users—it is sure to draw scrutiny from 
copyright owners. Any new or disruptive 
platform will likely have to prove its qual-
ification for the DMCA safe harbor or fair 
use exception, especially if the platform has 
been successful in generating users.
What compounds the problem is the 
rise of class-action copyright lawsuits, 
which raise the amount of possible statu-
tory damages at stake to astronomical and 
potentially business-ending amounts. The 
lengths of the two massive class-action 
lawsuits against Google Book Search and 
YouTube provide a sobering warning to 
new Internet platforms. The lawsuits were 
still ongoing in 2013, even after eight and 
six years, respectively, since they were filed. 
The litigation could easily require more 
than a dozen years to reach final decisions 
if the Supreme Court eventually reviews 
the cases. The protracted litigation could 
well stunt the development and growth of 
the technology, as appears to be the case 
with Google Book Search. 
This Article outlines a proposal for how Congress can update the Copyright 
Act to spur greater innovation in Internet 
platforms, while protecting the interests of 
authors. The proposal is presented in a bill 
titled the Nonprofit Internet Copyright 
Exemption (NICE) Act. The basic idea is 
that the Copyright Act should create more 
breathing room for developers to create new 
Internet platforms with greater assurance 
that the new uses of copyrighted works are 
permitted—a goal consistent with the Su-
preme Court’s admonition in Grokster and 
Sony. To that end, this Article proposes a 
flat, categorical copyright exemption for 
qualifying nonprofit institutions to develop 
Internet platforms that enable their users 
to create user-generated content, includ-
ing through Internet curation. Under this 
proposal, a nonprofit can qualify for “copy-
right-exempt” status similar to how it can 
qualify as tax-exempt under 501(c)(3) of 
the Tax Code.
The overriding goal of the NICE Act is 
to spur greater innovation in Internet plat-
forms that are socially beneficial by remov-
ing the threat of protracted and potentially 
business-ending litigation over copyright 
claims and defenses. In order for the ex-
emption to be effective, it must minimize 
the threat of copyright lawsuits being filed 
against a new technological use of content, 
while at the same time discouraging copy-
right infringement.
In that vein, the proposal offers a cate-
gorical exemption for a broad class of tech-
nological uses of content that can provide 
breathing room for developers to innovate. 
The proposal is meant to remedy the defi-
ciencies of the DMCA safe harbors, whose 
protection of only four functions for ISPs 
is too narrow and outdated, while also 
remedying the deficiencies of the fair use 
doctrine in being too vague. The proposal 
therefore seeks to define an exemption or 
safe harbor that is somewhere in between 
the DMCA and fair use in approach. In 
other words, the proposal seeks to exempt 
a broader class of functionalities than the 
DMCA under a rubric that can accommo-
date future innovations, but in a way that 
will not require case-by-case adjudication 
like the fair use doctrine. By exempting a 
broad, open-ended class of functionalities, 
but limiting them to a specific purpose, the 
NICE Act corrects the fundamental defect 
of the DMCA safe harbor.
The basic exemption under the NICE 
Act, which adds another exemption to the 
Copyright Act, shall read:
Section 123. Limitations on exclusive 
rights: nonprofit Internet plat-
forms for user-generated content.
[ 17 ]FALL 2014
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(a) Notwithstanding the provisions 
of section 106, it is not an infringe-
ment for an entity that qualifies as 
a tax-exempt entity under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code to develop and offer an In-
ternet platform that enables the 
public to utilize copyrighted works 
that are lawfully accessible free 
of charge on the Internet, for the 
public’s creation of user-generated 
content in the Internet platform, 
provided—
(1) the Internet platform is offered 
free of charge to the public;
(2) the Internet platform offers 
copyright owners a reasonable op-
portunity to opt out of the plat-
form so that their works on the 
Internet are not utilized in the 
platform; and
(3) the Internet platform provides 
a hyperlink to the webpage of the 
original source of a utilized copy-
righted work.
(b) It is not an infringement for 
users of Internet platforms that fall 
within the exemption in subsection 
(a) to utilize copyrighted works that 
are lawfully accessible free of charge 
on the Internet in noncommercial 
user-generated content that the us-
ers prepare.
 
At the same time, the proposal seeks to 
balance the interests of authors and copy-
right holders. For example, as explained 
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copyright exemption by electing to remove 
their works from the Internet platforms 
that fall within the exemption. In addition, 
copyright holders whose works are utilized 
in such platforms can potentially receive 
compensation for use of their works under 
the exemption by the establishment of an 
Authors’ Fund. To borrow Justice Souter’s 
words in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster, 
the goal is to create “a sound balance be-
tween the respective values of supporting 
creative pursuits through copyright pro-
tection and promoting innovation in new 
communication technologies by limiting 
the incidence of liability for copyright in-
fringement” (545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005)). ■
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In the late 1940s and early 1950s, one in three American male workers was a member of a labor union. Today that number is about one in ten, and much less than that in 
the private sector (less than 7%). (See Figure 1.) The prob-
lem of declining union membership is significant because or-
ganized labor and the rise of the American middle class have 
been inexorably linked. The National Labor Relations Act 
of 1935 (NLRA) helped to swell the ranks of organized la-
bor and create a middle class in the United States—a middle 
class that was “the envy of the world.” Unionization increased 
wages through collective bargaining and helped to provide 
health care and pensions to working families. Through legis-
lative advocacy, unions also helped to implement minimum 
wage legislation and other workplace standards that covered 
all workers, be they union members or not. In many instances, 
nonunion employers also copied the wages and terms and 
conditions of employment of their employees on what used 
to be considered model union contracts, such as those of 
General Motors, furthering the expansion of the American 
middle class. But those days are now over, and the American 
A summary of Organizing with International Framework Agreements: An Exploratory Study, 
___ UC Irvine Law Review ___ (under review).
BY CÉSAR F. ROSADO MARZÁN
ORGANIZING with IFAs
An Exploratory Study
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middle class seems to be shrinking into 
extinction. Union contracts are anything 
but “models” for many employers. Some-
times nonunion workers even resent union 
workers, because union workers receive 
perks unavailable to almost everyone else 
in the working class.
Legal scholars and social scientists have 
attributed the decline of unions to weak la-
bor laws that permit employer opposition 
of unions in the workplace, international 
competition created by globalization, and 
a peculiar anti-union political culture that 
permeates the United States. 
But while union density falls and in-
equality creeps upward in the United 
States, we have experienced the counter-
intuitive rise of international framework 
agreements (IFAs), or agreements signed by 
global union federations and multinational 
corporations. (See Figure 2.) These agree-
ments include guarantees that the signing 
employers and unions will abide by the 
core labor standards of the International 
Labor Organization, one of the oldest 
U.N. agencies. These core labor standards 
are: freedom of association and effective 
collective bargaining, the elimination of all 
forms of forced or compulsory labor, the 
effective abolition of child labor, and the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation. The first core 
labor standard, pertaining to freedom of 
association of effective collective bargain-
ing, includes the fundamental principle of 
non-interference with employees’ rights of 
Figure 1.
Union Density in the USA, Private, Public,
and Combined Sectors, 1973–2011*
Source: Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Data
from the CPS, available at http://www.unionstats.com.
*Excludes 1982 because of missing data.
Organizing with International Framework Agreements
Number of New IFAs Signed by Year, 1994–2012 (N = 110)
Figure 2.
Source: Adapted from ETUI, International Framework Agreements, available at http://www.ewcdb.eu.
association. In other words, IFAs contain 
employer pledges not to oppose workers 
who want to organize. If employer opposi-
tion against labor unions has been blamed 
for union decline, and employers who have 
signed IFAs have in effect pledged not to 
interfere with unions, can an IFA facilitate 
unionization in the United States?
To start to answer this question, I per-formed a research project in the U.S. 
and Europe—sponsored by Stockholm 
University and its Regulating Markets and 
Labor Program—in which I interviewed 
unions and multinational firms in the 
private security and auto industries that 
signed IFAs. I reported on four firms, rep-
resenting two industries: the private secu-
rity firms Securitas and Group 4 Securicor 
(G4S) and the automakers Daimler and 
Volkswagen. All of these firms have signed 
IFAs and have significant U.S. operations.
I found out that IFAs, on their own, 
are not sufficient to organize workers in the 
United States, even when the signatory em-
ployers respect the terms of the agreement. 
Several obstacles to union organizing other 
than employer opposition seem to prevent 
workers from organizing. One of these 
obstacles seems to be economic—the easy 
replacement of union with nonunion work-
ers facilitated by subcontracting, which is 
the norm in the private security industry. 
At Volkswagen, entry-level workers earn 
more than in the “Big 3” American auto-
makers covered by union contracts, making 
unionization at Volkswagen an uphill bat-
tle. Another obstacle seems to be anti-union 
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politics, which strongly affects auto plants 
in some southern states.
But while my case studies clearly show 
that the IFAs are not sufficient to organize 
workers, unions might use IFAs in a way 
that, although different from the exclusive 
representation model that American unions 
favor, could still effectively represent some 
workers: the “minority union.” Minority 
unions are unions that represent only their 
members. As I explain more fully in my 
Article, U.S. employers do not have the le-
gal duty to bargain with minority unions. 
However, under the international norms 
inscribed in the IFAs, employers should 
recognize minority unions. In fact, Volkswa-
gen recently seems to have recognized a mi-
nority union of the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) in Chattanooga, Tennessee, where 
the German firm builds the Passat model. 
I also argue that these IFA-supported 
minority unions would have more robust 
strike rights to build solidarity. The em-
ployer, if it lives by the IFA, should not 
permanently replace any economic striker. 
While employers can permanently replace 
economic strikers under U.S. labor law, it is 
proscribed under international standards.
Finally, such minority unions should 
also have the right to engage in secondary 
strikes and boycotts. Even though second-
ary activity is for the most part banned 
by U.S. labor law, international standards 
protect them in most instances. Employers 
who sign IFAs should not pursue injunc-
tive or damage claims against unions that 
engage in secondary strikes and boycotts.
Given that most IFAs are likely not le-gally binding instruments, unions 
need to enforce them with the help of la-
bor organizations and works councils in 
the home countries of the signatory firms. 
These foreign labor entities have preexisting 
bargaining relationships with the signatory 
corporations that are based in Europe and 
elsewhere. The foreign labor groups have 
ways of putting pressure on the foreign 
corporations that are unavailable to Amer-
ican unions, such as through work council 
representation, supervisory board represen-
tation, the use of the media in the corpora-
tions’ home countries, or simply through 
informal and direct, one-to-one conver-
sations between union and management 
leaders. In fact, worker organizations in the 
home countries of the signatory firms are 
constitutive of global unions and in some 
instances are the real parties behind the 
IFAs. In this manner, the IFA could pro-
vide a new organizational tool to American 
workers: a minority union “on steroids,” 
backed by global solidarity.
IFAs provide the opportunity for unions 
to better collaborate with the signatory em-
ployers both at the level of the shop and out-
side. The collaborative relationship between 
Volkswagen and the UAW in Chattanooga 
attests to this real possibility for “grown up” 
industrial relationships in the twenty-first 
century. 
In all, I conclude that IFAs could be-
come more effective tools to build some 
unions in the United States, but they have 
to be used in creative ways that build as-
sociational power outside the confines of 
“IFAs could become more effective tools to build some 
unions in the U.S., but they have to be used in creative, 
nontraditional ways.”
CÉSAR F. ROSADO MARZÁN
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the traditional American exclusive repre-
sentation union model. It is time to truly 
internationalize labor unions, both in their 
relations with the international labor move-
ment and in the way they relate to employ-
ees and employers in the United States. If, 
indeed, “another world is possible,” it has to 
begin at home—by challenging our existing 
ways of doing things and by living up to the 
exigencies our new, globalized century.  ■
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Africa’s Land Restitution Process
(Oxford University Press, summer 2014)
Land dispossession occurring in 
South Africa during colonialism 
and apartheid is a quintessential 
example of “dignity takings,” which 
involves the deprivation of property 
and also dignity. The nation has at-
tempted to move beyond the more 
common step of providing repara-
tions (compensation for physical 
losses) and to instead facilitate “dig-
nity restoration,” which is a com-
prehensive remedy that seeks to restore property while also 
confronting the underlying dehumanization, infantilization, 
and political exclusion that enabled the injustice. Professor 
Atuahene interviews over one hundred and fifty South Af-
ricans who participated in the nation’s land restitution pro-
gram and provides a snapshot of South Africa’s successes and 
failures in achieving dignity restoration.
BOOKSHELF      New books by faculty
Howard Eglit
Professor of Law
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Often Harmful—Mix and How to Fix It
(Self-published, spring 2014)
Using a synthesis of sociological, 
linguistic, and legal sources, this 
book addresses the uses and mis-
uses of language both to create and 
to perpetuate ageism—or negative 
biases regarding the elderly. The 
primary focus is on depictions and 
reports in the print news media, 
with attention also given to age bias 
in movies, television, and literature. 
Legal analysis is presented in an 
effort to determine whether there are law-based means to 
combat the rampant age discrimination that these vehicles 
of communication both create and nurture. Non-legal ini-
tiatives for combating ageism also are addressed. Professor 
Eglit is one of the best-known experts on law and aging in 
the U.S. He has litigated, spoken, and written extensively 
on these issues.
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El Principio de Protección del Trabajador en 
el Derecho Norteamericano (“The Protective 
Principle in U.S. Work Law,” with Sergio Gamonal C.)
(Thomson Reuters-Chile, forthcoming fall 2014)
Scholars have noted that judicial 
conservatism has eroded labor 
and employment law (i.e. “work 
law”) in the U.S. and elsewhere. 
The Roberts Court has kept in line 
with such conservatism, deciding a 
number of key work law cases in 
favor of employers. But work law 
has experienced a rebirth in South 
America after years of authoritar-
ian rule and dictatorship. There 
may be lessons that can be drawn 
from the South American experience for the U.S. and other 
jurisdictions where work law has suffered setbacks.
Visit Scholarly Commons @ IIT 














IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu
IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty Blog
http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty
@CKFacultyBlog
A forum that brings together all the rich intellectual contributions of the IIT Chicago-Kent faculty 
and that encourages respectful and scholarly dialogue within the extended IIT Chicago-Kent 
community. Posts cover the latest faculty news and a wide range of legal topics, from in-depth 
analyses of U.S. Supreme Court rulings to insights on law and culture.
